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Abstract
Both cognitive linguists and relevance theorists are developing original approaches 
to metaphor. Both shed new light on old debates and suggest fruitful directions for 
research. Although there has so far been little interaction between the two approaches, 
Raymond Gibbs and Markus Tendahl (2006, 2008) have recently begun to compare them 
and consider how they might be combined. This paper is intended as a contribution to 
that debate. After outlining some parallels and differences between the two approaches, 
I will discuss how they might fit together to give a fuller picture of the role of metaphor 
in language and thought. 
1. Introduction
In the last twenty-five years, traditional approaches to metaphor (in classical rhetoric 
or Gricean pragmatics, for instance) have been increasingly questioned on both 
theoretical and experimental grounds. Where traditional approaches treat metaphor
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as a departure from a maxim, norm or convention of literal truthfulness, there is 
a growing consensus that the Romantic critics of classical rhetoric were right to see 
metaphor as entirely normal, natural and pervasive in language. Where traditional 
approaches treat metaphor as a purely decorative device with little or no cog-
nitive significance, it is increasingly recognised that most metaphors cannot be 
paraphrased in literal terms without loss to the meaning. Relevance theorists and 
cognitive linguists, who have both explicitly distanced themselves from traditional 
approaches to metaphor, are part of this growing consensus.
However, relevance theorists and cognitive linguists see metaphor as entirely 
normal and natural for rather different reasons. Cognitive linguists have argued 
that metaphor is pervasive in language because it is pervasive in thought.1 As Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980: 153) put it, “Metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and 
action and only derivatively a matter of language.” On this approach, linguistic 
metaphors are treated as surface reflections of underlying conceptual mappings 
between different cognitive domains (e.g. the domains of love affairs and journeys, 
theories and buildings, arguments and fights), and have their roots in cognition 
rather than communication. Relevance theorists, on the other hand, have argued 
that metaphor arises naturally in linguistic communication, as language is loosely 
used in an attempt to convey complex thoughts which may be vague, but need 
not themselves be metaphorical. On this approach, there is a continuum of cases 
between literal talk, loose talk, hyperbole and metaphor, none of which is neces-
sarily a surface reflection of any pre-existing conceptual mapping. As Sperber and 
Wilson (2008: 84) put it, 
We see metaphors as simply a range of cases at one end of a continuum that includes 
literal, loose and hyperbolic interpretations. In our view, metaphorical interpreta-
tions are arrived at in exactly the same way as these other interpretations. There is 
no mechanism specific to metaphor, no interesting generalisation that applies only 
to them.
Until recently, relevance theorists and cognitive linguists have been more concerned 
with developing and applying their own approaches than comparing them with 
those of others. A notable exception has been Raymond Gibbs, whose pioneering 
experimental work draws on elements of both cognitive linguistics and relevance 
theory, and has had an important influence on both. In two recent papers, Gibbs and 
Markus Tendahl (2006, 2008) suggest that, despite some fundamental differences, 
relevance theory and cognitive linguistics may be seen as providing complementary 
rather than contradictory approaches to metaphor, and have begun to consider how 
they might be combined:
Many metaphor scholars … see these alternative theories as being radically different. 
After all, cognitive linguistics and relevance theory adhere to very different goals 
1 For cognitive linguistics approaches to metaphor, see Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 2003), Grady 
(1997), Gibbs (1998), Fauconnier & Turner (2002, 2008), Ruiz de Mendoza & Perez Hernandez 
(2003), Hampe (2005) and Müller (2008); see also McGlone (2001).
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and methodological assumptions… These different goals and working assump-
tions are so great, in fact, that few metaphor scholars have tried to systematically 
compare these two theories to understand how and why they differ. Yet there is also 
a small underground movement, as we have personally noted at various metaphor 
conferences, to begin thinking about ways that cognitive linguistics and relevance 
theory perspectives on metaphor may be complementary. These discussions arise 
as metaphor scholars … struggle with the deficiencies of each theory and begin to 
understand that both perspectives have something very important to contribute 
toward a comprehensive, cognitive theory of metaphor. (Tendahl & Gibbs 2008: 1824)
In this paper, I would like to take up Gibbs and Tendahl’s challenge and suggest 
some ways in which the two approaches to metaphor might combine. 
One way of reconciling the apparently incompatible views of relevance theorists 
and cognitive linguists about the origin of metaphors would be to look for evidence 
that some metaphors arise in language use and others in thought. As Gibbs and 
Tendahl point out, relevance theorists and cognitive linguists tend to focus on meta-
phors of rather different types. Whereas relevance theorists offer many analyses 
of standard examples such as (1a)–(1c), which are familiar from classical rhetoric, 
cognitive linguists have been more concerned with examples such as (2a)–(2c), which 
they see as reflecting conceptual mappings across cognitive domains:
(1) a. Robert is a computer.
b. Susan is a wild rose.
c. Sally is an angel.
(2) a. Bill’s marriage is on the rocks. (love is a journey)
b. He destroyed my defences. (arguments are fights)
c. Your theory is falling apart. (theories are buildings)
For anyone attempting a unitary account of metaphor, the challenge would be to 
show how both types of example can be analysed in the same way. In fact, relevance 
theorists have consistently argued that terms such as metaphor and irony pick out 
a variety of loosely related phenomena which do not necessarily all work in the 
same way: in other words, they have consistently argued that metaphor and irony 
are not natural kinds. There is thus a genuine question about whether the examples 
in (1) and (2) exploit the same cognitive and communicative mechanisms, and if 
so, whether they fit better with the relevance theory or the cognitive linguistics 
approach. 
A further way of exploring the possible interrelations between the relevance 
theory and cognitive linguistic treatments of metaphor would be to look at the 
central role of concepts in both approaches. According to relevance theory, hear-
ers understand linguistic metaphors by using linguistic and contextual clues to 
create new ‘ad hoc’ (occasion-specific) concepts, which are typically not identical 
to any of the concepts linguistically encoded by the metaphorically-used word 
or phrase, although they inherit some of their inferential properties from those 
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concepts. It might then be reasonable to assume that the repeated use of linguistic 
metaphors linking items from distinct cognitive domains might set up patterns 
of conceptual activation similar to those that cognitive linguists see as character-
istic of conceptual metaphor. To take just one illustration, many cultures have a 
set of flower metaphors (e.g. daisy, lily, violet, rose) which are typically applied to 
women. From a cognitive linguistics perspective, these linguistic metaphors might 
be seen as surface reflections of an underlying conceptual metaphor women are 
flowers, based on systematic correspondences between the domains of women and 
flowers. From a relevance theory perspective, these linguistic metaphors would be 
seen as originating in creative uses of language for opportunistic communicative 
purposes, which, if repeated often enough, might result in the setting up of sys-
tematic correspondences between the domains of women and flowers. Here again, 
there is a genuine question about whether, and to what extent, conceptual cross-
domain mappings originate in language use, and are therefore to be explained 
at least partly in pragmatic terms.
My aim in this paper is to argue that relevance theory offers a genuine alterna-
tive to cognitive linguistic approaches to metaphor, and can complement these 
approaches in at least two ways: first, by showing how some metaphors can arise as 
creative loose uses of language, and second, by showing how the idea that linguistic 
metaphors create new ‘ad hoc’ concepts has interesting implications for the cognitive 
linguistics treatment of metaphor. I hope the resulting picture will provide a basis 
for future discussion and stimulate further research on the possible interrelations 
between the two approaches.
2. Metaphor and lexical pragmatics – How word meanings are modified in use
The aim of a pragmatic account of metaphor is to explain how hearers recognise the 
intended meaning of a metaphorical utterance in context. According to relevance 
theory, linguistic metaphors originate as loose uses of language, in which a word or 
phrase is used to communicate a novel ‘ad hoc’ concept which is broader (more gen-
eral) than the encoded lexical meaning. In the metaphor Robert is a computer, for 
instance, the sentence uttered is (3a), and the encoded lexical meaning of the word 
computer is the concept computer, which denotes a certain type of machine used 
for processing information:
(3) a. Sentence uttered: Robert is a computer
b. Lexical meaning of ‘computer’: computer (i.e. a type of machine)
What the speaker communicates by use of the word computer in (3a), however, 
is not the lexical meaning computer but an ‘ad hoc’ concept with a broader de-
notation, which is constructed in the course of interpreting (3a), and which applies 
not only to actual computers but also to people who share some of the encyclo-
paedic properties of computers (for instance, they process information accurately, 
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lack common sense, intuition, human feelings, and so on). Thus, what might be 
communicated by uttering (3a) on a particular occasion could be represented as 
in (4), where computer* is a broader, ‘ad hoc’ concept whose denotation includes 
both computers and some humans:
(4) a. Speaker’s explicit meaning: Robert is a computer*
b. Implicatures: Robert lacks feelings, processes information well (etc.)
Relevance theory’s treatment of metaphor is part of a more general approach to 
lexical pragmatics which is based on the following assumptions. First, the lexical 
meaning of a word is merely a clue to the speaker’s meaning, and the concept 
communicated by use of a word typically differs from the lexical meaning. Second, 
metaphor is just one of many ways in which lexical meanings can be modified 
in use. The concept communicated by use of a word may be narrower (more spe-
cific) or broader (more general) than the lexical meaning (or it may be narrower 
in some respects and broader in others, as is often the case in metaphor). Third, 
there is a continuum of cases of broadening, ranging from strictly literal use, 
through various shades of approximation to hyperbole and metaphor, with no 
sharp cut-off point between them. Fourth, all these cases are interpreted in the 
same way: there are no special pragmatic principles or mechanisms that apply 
only to metaphors. And fifth, contrary to what is generally assumed in Gricean 
pragmatics and philosophy of language, the concept communicated by use of 
a word contributes to what the speaker is taken to have asserted (i.e. the truth-
conditional content of the utterance), and not only to what is implicated (Wilson & 
Carston 2007; Sperber & Wilson 2008). Since metaphorical uses of language – just 
like strictly literal uses – contribute to truth-conditional content and fall within 
the scope of logical connectives, they cannot be dismissed as marginal to the 
concerns of linguistics proper.2
The case of lexical narrowing can be illustrated using an example from Fau-
connier & Turner (2002: 27). As Fauconnier and Turner point out, the phrase red 
pencil is semantically very vague: the concept red pencil applies to any pencil that 
stands in some relation to the colour red, e.g. pencils which are painted red, pencils 
that write in red, pencils smeared with lipstick, pencils used to record the activities 
of a team dressed in red, and so on. Still, when a teacher marking an essay says 
“I need a red pencil”, she will certainly have some specific sub-type of red pencil in 
mind, and in order to understand her, the hearer must infer what particular type 
of red pencil this is. In other words, the teacher must be understood as asking not 
simply for a red pencil, but for a red pencil*, where red pencil* denotes the 
particular sub-type of pencil she has in mind. The interpretation of virtually any 
utterance involves some such form of lexical narrowing, and one of the goals of 
lexical pragmatics is to explain how it is achieved.
2 For recent relevance-theoretic treatments of metaphor, see e.g. Carston (2002), Higashi-
mori (2002), Wilson & Sperber (2002), Vega Moreno (2007), Wilson & Carston (2007, 2008), 
Sperber & Wilson (2008).
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Similarly, the interpretation of virtually any utterance involves some form of 
lexical broadening, in which the concept communicated by use of a word is more 
general than the lexical meaning. The broadening can be almost imperceptible, as in 
the following cases of approximation:
(5) a. The play starts at 7.00.
b. Jane’s hair is straight.
The speaker of (5a) would generally be understood as communicating that the play 
starts, not at 7.00 on the dot, but at approximately 7.00 (i.e. 7.00*), and the speaker 
of (5b) would generally be understood as communicating that Jane’s hair is, not 
straight in the strict geometric sense, but merely straight in an approximate sense 
appropriate to human hair (i.e. straight*). The interpretation of virtually any ut-
terance involves similar types of approximation, where a term with a strict meaning 
is loosely applied to what Lasersohn (1999) calls a “penumbra” of cases which fall 
just outside the linguistically-specified denotation.
According to relevance theory, approximation shades off imperceptibly into 
hyperbole. Consider the utterances in (6):
(6) a. The lecture hall was empty.
b. The water is freezing.
Let’s suppose that empty in (6a) is narrowed to mean (roughly) ‘empty of people’ 
(as opposed, say, to ‘empty of furniture’).3 Then the utterance would traditionally 
count as an approximation if the speaker is taken to mean that there were only 
a very few people present. In this case, use of the word empty would be understood 
as intended to convey a concept empty*, meaning ‘close enough to empty for the 
differences to be inconsequential’. By contrast, the same utterance would tradi-
tionally count as a hyperbole if the speaker is taken to mean that, although many 
people were present, there were more empty seats than might have been expected 
or desired. In this case, use of the word empty would be understood as intended 
to convey a broader concept empty**, meaning ‘closer to empty than expected or 
desired’. Here, it is easy to see there is a whole continuum of intermediate cases, with 
no sharp cut-off point between approximation and hyperbole. For relevance theo-
rists, this is not a matter for concern, since they claim that the distinction between 
approximation and hyperbole has no theoretical significance: an utterance does not 
have to be recognised as an approximation or hyperbole to be understood, no special 
interpretive mechanisms are needed in either case, and both are understood in the 
same way. However, for theories which draw a sharp distinction between literal and 
3  A more precise formulation would take account of the fact that narrowing and broadening 
apply at the level of the denotation of a concept rather than its meaning, so that the ‘ad hoc’ 
concept obtained by narrowing empty in (6a) is not empty of people, but simply a concept 
empty* that is satisfied only by rooms empty of people (and so on for other examples). 
For ease of exposition, I will ignore this issue here (see Sperber & Wilson 1998).
Studia Linguistica Universitatis Iagellonicae Cracoviensis vol. 128 (2011) © E. Mańczak-Wohlfeld & WUJ
Publikacja objęta jest prawem autorskim. Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. Kopiowanie i rozpowszechnianie zabronione
Parallels and differences in the treatment of metaphor… 201
figurative uses of language, or which treat approximation and hyperbole as involv-
ing different interpretive mechanisms, the fact that there is no clear cut-off point 
between them should be a serious matter for concern. Similar points apply to (6b), 
where there is a continuum of cases between the use of freezing to mean ‘actually 
freezing’, ‘almost freezing’ and ‘closer to freezing than expected or desired’. 
Although metaphor has received a great deal of attention in cognitive linguistics, 
and in philosophy and psychology more generally, hyperbole has received much less 
attention. According to relevance theory, there is no clear dividing line between 
hyperbole and metaphor, and an adequate account of metaphor should therefore 
apply to hyperbole in the same way. To illustrate, consider the utterances in (7):
(7) a. John is a giant.
b. John is as tall as the Eiffel Tower.
c. John is incredibly tall.
One possible way of distinguishing hyperbole from metaphor would be to treat hy-
perbole as involving an increase in quantity along a single dimension (e.g. height), 
while metaphor would involve a qualitative change (so that the speaker in metaphori-
cal uses of (7) would be understood as attributing to John properties not directly 
linked to height). According to this criterion, (7a) would count as a hyperbole if 
taken to mean that John is very tall for a human, and as a metaphor if taken to 
mean that John stands out for other reasons than simply his height. However, again 
there is a gradient between the two types of case, with increases in quantity along 
a single dimension ultimately leading to a qualitative change. For instance, all three 
utterances in (7) activate thoughts of John’s height as being not merely human but 
superhuman, and these carry implications for other properties than simply his 
height. Thus, hyperbole shades off imperceptibly into metaphor, and is not reducible 
to an ornamental device with little or no cognitive significance. From a cognitive 
linguistics perspective, if metaphor is analysed in terms of cross-domain mapping, 
it follows that hyperbole must be analysed in a similar way. But while hyperboles 
such as (7a) or (7b) might conceivably be analysed in terms of such mappings (e.g. be-
tween the domains of people and superhumans, or people and buildings), others, 
such as (7c), have no obvious analysis in conceptual metaphor terms.
The relevance theory approach to lexical pragmatics suggests that it should be 
possible to find a single utterance which can be intended and understood liter-
ally, loosely, hyperbolically or metaphorically on different occasions. Here is an 
illustration:
(8) The audience slept through the lecture.
In certain circumstances, an utterance of (8) might be intended and understood as 
making the very strong claim that the audience was literally asleep throughout the 
lecture. In other circumstances, it might be intended and understood as making 
the slightly weaker claim that the audience was, if not literally asleep, at least on the 
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point of falling asleep during the lecture: in traditional terms, it would then count as 
an approximation. In different circumstances, (8) might be intended and understood 
as claiming, still more weakly, that the audience was, if not asleep or on the point 
of sleep, at least in a physical state of drowsiness during the lecture: in traditional 
terms, it would then count as a hyperbole. Finally, in many circumstance, (8) might 
be intended and understood as making a weaker claim still: that the audience, if not 
literally asleep, on the point of sleep or even feeling physically drowsy, was at least 
extremely bored and unresponsive during the lecture: in traditional terms, it would 
then count as a metaphor. This example illustrates two central features of relevance 
theory’s approach to lexical pragmatics: that there is a continuum of cases between 
literal use, approximation, hyperbole and metaphor, and that the choice between dif-
ferent possible interpretations is heavily context dependent.
The flexibility and context-dependence of lexical-pragmatic interpretation pre-
sents a challenge for both relevance theory and cognitive linguistics. The goal of 
pragmatics is to explain how hearers infer the speaker’s intended meaning from 
clues provided by the utterance and the context. But if utterance interpretation 
typically involves the narrowing or broadening of lexical meaning, as relevance 
theory claims, how do hearers ever recognise the speaker’s intended meaning? 
What factors trigger the narrowing or broadening process? What determines the 
direction it takes, and when it stops? Similarly, if utterance interpretation typically 
involves the use of conceptual metaphors, blending, domain mapping, and so on, as 
cognitive linguistics claims, how do hearers ever recognise the speaker’s intended 
meaning? What factors trigger the mapping / blending process? What determines 
the direction it takes, and when it stops? Here, relevance theory has a concrete 
proposal to make, which may be of interest to cognitive linguists attempting to 
answer parallel questions about how linguistic metaphors are used and understood. 
In the next section, I will briefly outline the basic features of the relevance theory 
approach and illustrate its application to metaphorical examples such as those in 
(1) and (2) above.
3. Relevance theory and metaphor interpretation
The goal of lexical pragmatics is to explain how lexical meanings are adjusted in the 
course of communication. The explanation suggested by relevance theory is that lexi-
cal meanings are adjusted in order to satisfy expectations of relevance. In a nutshell, 
the theory claims that utterances addressed to one raise expectations of relevance not 
raised by other stimuli, and that hearers are entitled to treat the encoded linguistic 
meaning as a clue to the speaker’s meaning, and to follow a path of least effort in 
adjusting this encoded meaning to a point where it yields an overall interpretation 
that satisfies those expectations.
In more technical terms, relevance is defined as a property of inputs to cogni-
tive processes (whether external stimuli, which can be perceived and attended 
to, or internal representations, which can be stored, recalled, or used as premises 
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in inference). An input is relevant to an individual when it connects with available 
contextual assumptions to yield positive cognitive effects (for instance, true contex-
tual implications, warranted strengthenings or revisions of existing assumptions). 
For present purposes, the most important type of cognitive effect is a contextual 
implication: an implication deducible from input and available contextual as-
sumptions together, but from neither input nor contextual assumptions alone. 
Other things being equal, the more implications derived, and the smaller the mental 
effort required to represent the input, access an appropriate set of contextual as-
sumptions and derive these implications, the greater the relevance of the input to 
the individual at that time.4 
Relevance theory is based on two general claims about the role of relevance in 
cognition and communication: 
Cognitive Principle of Relevance: 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.
Communicative Principle of Relevance: 
Every act of overt intentional communication conveys a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance.
The Cognitive Principle of Relevance yields a variety of predictions about human 
cognitive processes. It predicts that the human cognitive system has evolved in such 
a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend spontaneously to pick out potentially rel-
evant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend spontaneously to activate po-
tentially relevant assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously 
to process them in the most productive way. This principle has essential implications 
for human communication. In order to communicate, the communicator needs 
her audience’s attention. If attention tends to go automatically to what seems most 
relevant at the time, then the success of communication depends on the audience 
taking the utterance to be relevant enough to be worthy of attention. Wanting her 
communication to succeed, the communicator, by the very act of communicating, 
indicates that she wants the audience to see her utterance as relevant, and this is 
what the Communicative Principle of Relevance states.
According to relevance theory, the presumption of optimal relevance conveyed 
by every utterance is precise enough to ground a specific comprehension heuristic 
that hearers can use in interpreting the speaker’s meaning:
Presumption of optimal relevance
a. The utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing.
b. It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and 
preferences.
4 For fuller exposition of relevance theory, and comparison with alternative approaches, see Sper-
ber & Wilson (1995), Carston (2002) and Wilson & Sperber (2004).
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Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic
a. Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance 
(e.g. in resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, adjusting lexical 
meaning, supplying contextual assumptions, deriving implications, etc.).
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.
A hearer using this heuristic during online comprehension should proceed in the 
following way. The aim is to find an overall interpretation that satisfies the presump-
tion of optimal relevance. To achieve this aim, he must enrich the decoded sentence 
meaning at the explicit level, and complement it at the implicit level by supplying 
contextual assumptions which will combine with it to yield enough implications 
to make the utterance relevant in the expected way. What route should he follow 
in disambiguating, assigning reference, adjusting lexical meaning, constructing a 
context, deriving conclusions, etc.? According to the relevance-theoretic comprehen-
sion heuristic, he should follow a path of least effort in looking for implications, and 
stop when the resulting overall interpretation yields enough implications to satisfy 
his expectations of relevance.
As noted above, the goal of lexical pragmatics is to explain what triggers prag-
matic adjustment processes such as lexical narrowing and broadening, what direction 
they take, and when they stop. Relevance theory suggests the following answers to 
these questions. First, lexical adjustments are triggered by the search for an interpre-
tation that yields enough implications to satisfy the expectations of relevance raised 
by the utterance. Second, they follow a path of least effort, starting with the most 
accessible contextual assumptions, the most accessible narrowings or broadenings, 
the most accessible implications. Third, they involve mutually adjusting tentative 
hypotheses about contextual assumptions, explicit content (including adjusted 
‘ad hoc’ concepts) and implications so that the resulting overall interpretation satisfies 
the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance. And finally, the adjustment 
process stops when the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance are satisfied 
(or abandoned). I will shortly illustrate how this is done.
As noted above, an important ingredient of this account is the idea that lexi-
cal comprehension typically involves the construction of an ‘ad hoc’ concept, or 
occasion-specific sense, which may be broader or narrower than the encoded lexical 
meaning. Use of the term ad hoc concept in this connection is often traced to the 
psychologist Lawrence Barsalou (1987, 1993), whose work on categorisation showed 
that prototypical narrowing (i.e. the interpretation of a general term as picking out 
the subset of prototypical category members) was much more flexible and context-
dependent than had previously been assumed. In later work by the psycholinguist 
Sam Glucksberg and colleagues (2001), and by relevance theorists (e.g. Carston 2002; 
Wilson & Sperber 2002), it was suggested that the outcome of the ‘ad hoc’ concept 
construction process could also be a broadening of the encoded lexical meaning. 
This opened up the possibility of a unified account on which lexical narrowing and 
broadening (or a combination of the two) are the outcomes of a single interpretive 
process which fine-tunes the interpretation of almost every word.
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A second important ingredient of this approach to lexical pragmatics is the as-
sumption that lexical concepts (e.g. computer, giant) provide access to an ordered 
array of encyclopaedic information about items falling under the concept. This ency-
clopaedic information is not seen as part of the semantic content of the concept, but 
as providing a reservoir of potential contextual assumptions which, when added to 
the context, can contribute to relevance by yielding contextual implications. A given 
encyclopaedic assumption will be more or less accessible on different occasions, and 
will yield different potential implications depending on what else is present in the 
utterance and the discourse context. It will therefore make different contributions 
to relevance on both the processing effort and cognitive effect sides. Thus, a speaker 
who intends her utterance to be understood in a certain way should make sure that 
the appropriate encyclopaedic assumptions are accessible enough to be selected, 
added to the context and used to derive the intended implications by a hearer using 
the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic.
To illustrate how this account might apply in a case of lexical narrowing, con-
sider how the utterance in (9) might be understood by a hearer using the relevance-
theoretic comprehension heuristic:
(9) Teacher, carrying a pile of essays: I need a red pencil.
As noted above, the concept red pencil is semantically vague: its denotation in-
cludes any pencil that stands in some relation to the colour red, and it will provide 
access to a huge array of encyclopaedic information about such pencils and their 
uses. Still, according to relevance theory, the utterance of (9) creates a presumption 
of relevance which entitles the addressee to follow a path of least effort in construct-
ing an overall interpretation on which the utterance yields enough implications to 
make it relevant in the expected way. According to spreading activation models of 
memory, the most accessible assumptions in the encyclopaedic entry for red pen-
cil at any given point will be those simultaneously activated by several features of 
the utterance and the discourse context. With (9), the fact that the speaker needs a 
red pencil should activate encyclopaedic information about the uses to which red 
pencils can be put. The fact that the speaker is a teacher will add an extra layer of 
activation to information about the uses of red pencils by teachers, and this will 
include the information that teachers use pencils that write in red when marking 
essays. The fact that the teacher is carrying a pile of essays will add a further layer 
of activation to this same encyclopaedic assumption that teachers use pencils that 
write in red when marking essays, which should therefore be the most accessible 
assumption in the encyclopaedic entry for red pencil during the interpretation of 
the utterance in (9). By assuming that the phrase red pencil was intended to convey 
not the very general encoded concept red pencil but the narrower concept red 
pencil* (i.e. ‘pencil used to write in red’), the hearer can thus arrive at an overall in-
terpretation which satisfies his expectation of relevance by implying that the teacher 
wants him to help her find a red pencil*. According to the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension heuristic, he is justified in making this assumption, because it is the 
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least effort-demanding way of finding an overall interpretation that yields enough 
implications to make the utterance relevant in the expected way. 
To illustrate how the same account might apply in a case of lexical broadening, 
consider how the utterance in (8) above (repeated below for convenience) might 
be understood by a hearer using the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic:
(8) The audience slept through the lecture.
On a Gricean account, (8) should have four distinct interpretations: as a literal as-
sertion, an approximation, a hyperbole or a metaphor. Of these, the hearer should 
test the literal interpretation first, and consider a figurative interpretation only if 
the literal interpretation blatantly violates the maxim of truthfulness. However, the 
fact that there is both experimental and introspective evidence against the Gricean 
account when construed as a model of utterance comprehension (e.g. Gibbs 1994; 
Glucksberg 2001; Wilson & Sperber 2002) justifies the search for an alternative 
analysis of (8). According to relevance theory, there is no presumption that literal 
interpretations are the first to be tested. The encoded concept sleep is merely a point 
of access to an ordered array of encyclopaedic assumptions from which the hearer 
is expected to choose in constructing an overall interpretation that satisfies his ex-
pectations of relevance. Here, the encyclopaedic entry for sleep might give access 
to the following type of assumptions:
Encyclopaedic entry for sleep: 
a. become mentally disengaged
b. lose interest in one’s surroundings
c. become motionless and unresponsive
d. gradually lose consciousness
e. undergo physical changes (snoring, slowed heart-rate, deep breathing, etc.)
In different discourse contexts, different members of this set will be more or less accessi-
ble, and depending on which of them are chosen, the result will be a relatively narrower 
or broader interpretation of the word slept. Here, a literal interpretation will result only 
if assumption (e) is added to the context. However, since it is extremely rare for the 
audience actually to lose consciousness at a lecture, this assumption is unlikely to be 
strongly activated in that particular discourse context. By contrast, the mention of an 
audience at a lecture is quite likely to activate assumptions such as (a)–(c), having to do 
with loss of interest, unresponsiveness and mental disengagement. These assumptions, 
if added to the context, would contribute to relevance by providing access not only to 
information about the state of the audience but also to further implications about the 
quality of the lecture or of the lecturer. The resulting interpretation (which would be 
traditionally classified as hyperbolic or metaphorical) would be likely to satisfy the 
expectations of relevance raised by the utterance. Only if this interpretation fails to 
satisfy those expectations would the hearer be justified in accessing further contextual 
assumptions and moving towards a more literal interpretation.
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One consequence of this approach to lexical pragmatics is its prediction that, 
typically, a loose interpretation, based on a few highly accessible encyclopaedic 
properties, will satisfy the hearer’s expectation of relevance without a more literal 
interpretation ever being considered. To illustrate this point further, consider a re-
cent attested example in which the word giant was metaphorically used. When the 
novelist John Updike died in January 2009, many obituaries contained comments 
such as the following:
(10) Updike was a giant.
The question is, how should this utterance be understood? The encyclopaedic entry 
for giant might provide access to information of the following sort: that giants have 
extraordinary height, imposing presence, powers beyond those of ordinary humans, 
stand out from the crowd, and so on. What is interesting about this example is that, 
even though the word giant is very often used hyperbolically to mean ‘unusually tall’ 
(as in (7a) above), the utterance of (10) in this particular discourse context would 
intuitively not be taken to implicate that Updike was very tall. This is so even though 
giants are stereotypically associated with unusual height, and, moreover, despite 
the fact that Updike himself happened to be unusually tall. The relevance-theoretic 
account sheds some light on how this utterance would be understood. In the first 
place, the expectations of relevance raised by an obituary of a public figure would 
lead the audience to look for implications having more to do with lifetime achieve-
ments than with physical properties. In this case, processing (10) in the context of 
easily accessible encyclopaedic information about Updike’s status as a novelist should 
yield enough implications to satisfy the audience’s expectations of relevance without 
information about his physical stature being considered at all. As a result, an obitu-
arist who did want to draw attention to Updike’s height as well as his achievements 
as a novelist would have to rephrase (10) in such a way as to encourage them to look 
for further implications. One way of doing this would be as in (11):
(11) Updike was a giant, in every sense of the word.
This reformulation calls for extra processing effort, and according to the relevance-
theoretic comprehension heuristic, it should thus encourage a search for extra impli-
cations. An alternative strategy used by several of Updike’s obituarists was to describe 
him not simply as a giant, but as a literary giant, or a giant of American literature, 
again calling for more processing effort but creating more precise expectations of 
relevance which exclude the possibility of considering Updike’s physical stature at all.
Returning now to the examples in (1) and (2), I will briefly illustrate how this ap-
proach might apply in a case of each type. Consider, first, how the metaphor Robert 
is a computer might be understood in the following two exchanges:
(12) a. Peter: Is Robert a good accountant?
b. Mary: Robert is a computer.
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(13) a. Peter: How good a friend is Robert?
b. Mary: Robert is a computer.
In each case, the encoded sense of computer activates some encyclopaedic features 
of computers that they may share with some humans. Like the best accountants, 
computers can process large amounts of numerical information and never make 
mistakes, and so on. Unlike good friends, computers lack emotions, intuitions, com-
mon sense, concern for others, and so on. In each case, in interpreting Mary’s utter-
ance, Peter constructs an ‘ad hoc’ concept computer* which is indicated, though 
not encoded, by the word computer, such that Robert’s falling under this concept 
has implications that answer the question in (12a) or (13a). Notice that Mary need 
not have a very precise idea of the implications that Peter will derive, as long as her 
utterance encourages him to derive the kind of implications that answer his ques-
tion in the intended way. So the Romantics were right to argue that the figurative 
meaning of a linguistic metaphor cannot be properly paraphrased. However, this is 
not because the meaning consists of some non-truth-conditional set of associations 
or “connotations”, as the Romantics believed, but because it involves an ‘ad hoc’ 
concept which is characterised by its inferential role rather than by a definition, and, 
moreover, because this inferential role – to a much greater extent than in the case 
of mere approximations – is left to the hearer to elaborate. In relevance-theoretic 
terms, metaphorical communication is relatively weak communication (on the no-
tion of weak communication, see Wilson & Sperber 2004; Sperber & Wilson 2008).
Finally, consider how the metaphorical utterance in (2a) above (repeated below 
for convenience) might be analysed on this approach:
(2) a. Bill’s marriage is on the rocks.
Let’s suppose that this metaphor is being encountered for the first time by someone 
whose encyclopaedic information about marriage contains no conceptual metaphors 
of the type marriages are journeys. In this discourse context, the hearer would be 
entitled to expect (2a) to achieve relevance by carrying implications about the state 
of Bill’s marriage, and the most highly activated assumptions in his encyclopaedic 
entry for the concept on the rocks would be those that apply not only to voyages but 
also to (some) marriages. For instance, both voyages and marriages have a shorter or 
longer duration, and may end in more or less desirable or unexpected ways. Both voy-
ages and marriages have participants who may experience various degrees of fear 
or distress and need various forms of help or comfort if they end in undesirable or 
unexpected ways. Given this, it should be possible to construct an ‘ad hoc’ concept 
on the rocks*, which is indicated, though not encoded, by the phrase on the rocks, 
and which is such that the claim that Bill’s marriage falls under this concept carries 
implications about the state of his marriage that make the utterance relevant in the 
expected way. Similar implications would be carried by a wide range of linguistic 
metaphors unconnected with the conceptual metaphor marriages are journeys. 
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For instance, descriptions of Bill’s marriage as down the drain, down the plughole, 
out of the window, up in flames, on its last legs, on its deathbed, and so on, would 
achieve relevance in broadly similar ways (but with subtle differences in the types 
of implications they activate, which would make the choice between them more 
than a purely arbitrary affair).
This analysis shows how the linguistic meaning of the phrase on the rocks might 
be spontaneously adjusted in constructing an interpretation that is relevant in the 
expected way, even by someone with no previous experience of metaphorical uses 
linking love affairs to journeys. But of course, many of the examples used in both 
relevance theory and cognitive linguistics contain metaphorical expressions whose 
interpretation is more or less a matter of routine. Moreover, cognitive linguists have 
made valuable contributions to our understanding of how linguistic metaphors 
often cluster around a central theme, so that a marriage may be described, for 
instance, not only as on the rocks, but in other terms related to voyages: e.g. in the 
doldrums, stormy, tempestuous or becalmed. I will end this section by consider-
ing how the repeated use of linguistic metaphors may lead to the setting up of 
systematic conceptual correspondences of the type that cognitive linguists have 
so fruitfully studied.
According to relevance theory, the lexical meaning of virtually every word in 
an utterance is contextually adjusted in order to satisfy expectations of relevance. 
The adjustment process may be a spontaneous, one-off affair, involving the con-
struction of an ‘ad hoc’ concept which is used once and then forgotten; or it may be 
regularly and frequently followed, by a few people or a group, until, over time, the re-
sulting ‘ad hoc’ concept may stabilise in a community and give rise to an extra lexi-
calised sense (Sperber & Wilson 1998; Vega Moreno 2007; Wilson & Carston 2007). 
As Vega Moreno (2007) shows, routinisation affects the amount of processing effort 
needed to understand an utterance: the more a word is broadened or narrowed in 
a particular way, the less effort it will cost to follow the same route in the future, and 
hence the more likely it is to be followed by hearers using the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension heuristic.
Repeated encounters with linguistic metaphors linking two conceptual domains 
(e.g. the domains of marriage and voyages, or women and flowers) may lead to the 
setting up of systematic cross-domain correspondences of the type familiar from 
cognitive linguistics, so that thoughts of marriage may automatically activate as-
pects of our encyclopaedic information about journeys, and thoughts of women 
may automatically activate aspects of our encyclopaedic knowledge of flowers, just 
as cognitive linguists predict. These cross-domain correspondences would in turn 
facilitate the production and interpretation of new linguistic metaphors based on 
the same conceptual activation patterns, resulting in thematically-related clusters 
of linguistic metaphors, just as cognitive linguists predict. On relevance theory’s 
account, these patterns of activation would ultimately derive from the repeated 
use of linguistic metaphors, and thus arise for communicative rather than purely 
cognitive reasons.
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4. Broader implications
As Tendahl and Gibbs (2008: 1824) point out, relevance theory and cognitive lin-
guistics differ in some of their goals and working assumptions. These differences 
have often obscured the broader parallels in their approaches to metaphor, and to 
lexical meaning in general. Having drawn attention to some of these parallels and 
argued that in many respects the two approaches are complementary rather than 
contradictory, I will end by outlining some of the differences between them and 
considering how they might be resolved.
As noted above, a central difference is that cognitive linguists see linguistic 
metaphors as depending on pre-existing cross-domain mappings, whereas relevance 
theory suggests that cross-domain conceptual mappings may result from repeated 
use of linguistic metaphors, but are not essential to either the production or the 
interpretation of metaphors. More generally, relevance theorists see metaphors as 
arising primarily in linguistic communication, whereas cognitive linguists see them 
as arising primarily in thought. I have suggested that the two approaches could be 
reconciled by finding evidence that some cross-domain mappings arise in language 
and others in thought.
However, these differences in the treatment of metaphor can be traced to a more 
fundamental difference in the relative priority that the two approaches assign to 
the study of communication (as opposed to cognition). Both relevance theory and 
cognitive linguistics reject the Conduit metaphor (i.e. the code model of commu-
nication) as inadequate, and both advocate an inferential approach to communica-
tion. But while cognitive linguists tend to assume that understanding utterances 
is simply a matter of applying general-purpose cognitive and linguistic abilities to 
the communicative domain, relevance theorists have argued that understanding 
utterances involves special-purpose inferential procedures that apply only in the 
communicative domain. According to relevance theory, utterance comprehension 
involves not merely drawing common-sense inferences, but drawing inferences 
about the communicator’s meaning, which is a complex mental state consisting 
of both an informative and a communicative intention. Inferring this meaning 
therefore crucially involves an ability to “mindread” (i.e. to infer the mental states 
of others on the basis of their behaviour), and there is a growing body of evidence 
that “mindreading” is a special-purpose inferential ability with its own specific pat-
terns of development and breakdown.5 In fact, relevance theorists have gone even 
further, and argued that the ability to infer communicators’ meanings involves 
more specialised inferential procedures attuned to regularities that exist only in 
the communicative domain (Sperber & Wilson 2002).6 These regularities include 
the fact described in the Communicative Principle of Relevance, that utterances 
(and other acts of overt communication) raise expectations of relevance not raised 
5 See Astington et al. (1988), Wellman et al. (2001), Sodian (2004), Matsui et al. (2006, 2009).
6 Further evidence that communication is a special-purpose ability is provided in Southgate 
et al. (2007), Liszkowski et al. (2008), Southgate et al. (2009), and Wilson (2009, forthcoming).
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by ordinary actions, and underpin the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuris-
tic, a special-purpose inferential procedure which yields valid results only when 
applied to overt communicative acts. These differences in the treatment of overt 
communication in relevance theory and cognitive linguistics could be resolved by 
further developmental or neuropsychological evidence.
It is worth pointing out that while waiting for this issue to be resolved, cogni-
tive linguistics still stands to benefit from relevance theory in two important ways. 
In the first place, cognitive linguists face a major challenge in explaining how hearers 
not only understand most metaphorical utterances, but typically understand them 
in the way the speaker intended. A pragmatic approach such as relevance theory, 
which fits well with many of the assumptions of cognitive linguistics, suggests 
a natural way of explaining how the inferences hearers draw in communicative 
situations might be suitably constrained. In the second place, although cognitive 
linguists and relevance theorists have both emphasised the importance of inference 
in metaphor interpretation, cognitive linguists face a major challenge in explain-
ing how the inferences that hearers draw in the course of utterance comprehen-
sion are properly warranted. Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 246) see the key to their 
approach to conceptual metaphor as lying in the fact that “we systematically use 
inference patterns from one conceptual domain to reason about another.” But as 
both conceptual metaphor theorists and blending theorists recognise, not all the 
inferential patterns from one conceptual domain are valid when carried over to the 
other. What is needed is some way of distinguishing mere conceptual associations 
or co-activations from valid inferences. Here again, relevance theory suggests a 
possible way out. What makes it valid to draw a particular inference in interpret-
ing a given utterance is that, unless this inference were valid, the utterance would 
not yield enough implications to be relevant in the expected way. Thus, a speaker 
who formulates her utterance in such a way as to encourage her hearer to derive 
a certain inference is largely responsible for its validity. Thus, here again, a prag-
matic account of metaphor of the type proposed by relevance theory might have 
worthwhile implications for cognitive linguistics.
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